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Alcenat: revamping the welfare state

Revamping the Welfare State:
Obama and the Class Challenge of American Politics
Westenley Alcenat
I. Introduction: A Civic Problem
In 1903, the Civil Rights leader and scholar activist, W. E. B. Du Bois, warned that:
THE PROBLEM of the twentieth century is the problem of the color-line—the
relation of the darker to the lighter races of men in Asia and Africa, in America
and the islands of the sea. It was a phase of this problem that caused the Civil
War.1
At every stage of major historical events in America in the last century, Du Bois’s thesis has
been validated. The New Deal, for example, failed to radicalize the politics of race and create a
more inclusive union. Instead, what initially seemed to be a class struggle took on the racialized
perception of being more socially beneficial to white Americans than to others. Furthermore, the
notoriety of the Civil Rights movement, in terms of the conflicts it posed between government
and civil demands, and between the professed ideals of the Constitution and the legal practice of
racial segregation, substantiates Du Bois’s claim. President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society also
emerged with a racial premise, except this time whites viewed its social policies as benefiting
African Americans. More importantly, the cultural and racial backlash spurred by the Civil
Rights movement and the Great Society extended well into the 1960s and 1970s, further
highlighting the significance of the color-line.
Yet, what if we reconsider the Du Boisian analysis in a different light? This essay will part
ways with his racial analysis to argue that the sociopolitical lives of Americans are also
dominated by a national consciousness of individualism. As a result, many Americans disregard
issues relating to the class problems of the country. Consequently, focusing on issues of class
inequalities is easily confused with socialism. Therefore, while race and class mutually reinforce
each other, the political and social perceptions in which they are framed view class as
unimportant. The Tea Party movement, while not representative of the larger public, is
symptomatic of this point. Reframing Du Bois’s warning, this essay argues that in the 21st
century (as in the 20th century), U.S. politics lacks a class consciousness. It accentuates the
schism between traditional American individualism and an emerging need to redress acute class
issues.
In short, the essay frames this as a uniquely American problem: the overemphasis on the
individual over society at the expense of recognizing wider class inequalities. Understanding this
dichotomy explains some of the difficulties President Barack Obama experienced in his efforts to
overhaul the health care system and why the initiative is sometimes labeled socialism. The major
objective of the argument is to analyze class and racial issues that have come to characterize the
challenges and limits the President faces in his efforts. Thus, portions of this article are arguably
opinionated, and use the Tea Party movement as an example to highlight facts and sources. Other
sections are substantively more historically grounded.
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The essay starts by providing a review of Obama as an emerging political phenomenon. The
following section scrutinizes the Tea Party movement and why it opposes Obama’s policies, as
well as how its grievances contextualize American individualism within a class perspective. That
perspective is rooted in Ayn Rand’s “egoism” and “objectivism” and John Locke’s principles of
governance. The study then provides a deeper commentary on the failures of Obama’s leadership,
with some suggestions about lessons to be learned in reaching the American public. The
conclusion summarizes the need for a renewed sense of leadership built on the opportunities
stemming from the current crises and driven by new ideas for reforming the welfare state.
II. Overview: The Phenomenon of Obama
Given the enormous crises he inherited, including the deepest economic recession in generations
and a deteriorated welfare state, Obama is the only president to successfully bring the country
nearer to universal health care. Before delving into the substance of why health care reform has
been controversial, consider how President Obama’s role in framing the policy constructs his
political image. Built by public perceptions of his politics, Obama’s image involves complex
representations of his status as the country’s first black president. In the subsequent paragraphs,
the overview helps to broadly clarify the grievances of the opposition against health care reform,
the President’s number one item on the domestic agenda.
First, health care reform is the Obama administration’s signature domestic objective because it
does the most to significantly alter the U.S.’s systemic class structures.2 Moreover, it highlights
the President’s goal to rebuild what he sees as the decline of American human capital in the last
three decades.3 On March 21, 2010, that promise was partially realized when the United States
Congress passed a landmark health care bill. The legislation passed despite well-organized
resistance from the Republican Party, most significantly embodied in the rise of the Tea Party
movement.
“Obamacare,” as his opponents deride it, is politically progressive in its objectives and it is
ambitiously transformative. Like the initiatives of the Franklin D. Roosevelt government in the
1930s, the current administration hopes the reform will provide a transformation that redresses
the failures of the unmitigated marketplace.4 The health care initiative is the Obama
administration’s prescription of progressivism as a pragmatic dosage of social remedy. However,
in today’s political arena, the biggest question still confronting any president is whether it is
possible to be both a great social transformer and a pragmatist in American politics. The
enactment of the national health care bill is the largest private-public partnership since the days
of Lyndon Johnson’s entitlement programs, Medicare and Medicaid. The measure requires most
Americans to have health insurance coverage and will add 16 million people to the Medicaid
program. It will also subsidize private insurance for low- and middle-income families. Moreover,
it regulates the health insurance industry more closely by limiting its ability to deny insurance to
certain patients.5 This push for a national health care system makes Mr. Obama the quintessential
social democrat of the 21st century.
Beyond the social democrat label, what is the Obama phenomenon? As columnist David
Brooks points out in “Getting Obama Right,” to the Republican conservatives Obamacare
disrupts the functions of the marketplace and is a government intrusion into the personal business
of American citizens.6 Brooks’s observation speaks to the belief of many in the Tea Party
movement that Obama is against everything that is American. Hence, he is undermining the
country’s political identity, mainly the privatist ethos of American individualism. On this point,
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the “Tea Partiers” share some of the Left’s complaints that Obama believes in the scientific
expertise of government. That is to say, the President thinks he can mollify the forces of
capitalism through intellectual management. As historian Eric Foner points out, Obama’s belief
is reminiscent of Jimmy Carter’s micromanagement style that is distinctly of the highly educated,
centrist liberal class.7 However, the changing nature of the times—the crises of markets and
subsequently the feared decline in the power of the individual in the market—presses Obama to
construct himself as the pragmatic American, conceivably rising above politics. Like a
Republican, he rejects a command-and-control regulation regime, but, like a Democrat, he
embraces those regulatory reforms and tools that help the market operate effectively.8 This move
ensures the Left that he is still a champion of their social causes, but more importantly reassures
the Republican Party that he is simply moderating the system, not overhauling it. In this scenario,
Obama is no one’s politician except the nation’s—crafting the impression that he is above
politics. To echo The New York Times political columnist, Mat Bai, unlike his predecessor, the
President wants to govern on the premise that he is the antithesis of Washington’s political
culture, hence uninterested in building a political majority for his allies.9 He thus elevates
himself to a separate plane, one that transcends the status quo and is seemingly transformative.
Such a detached political role further ensures that the President is flexible enough to claim that
he stands on neutral ground.
The President’s pragmatism is seen in his willingness to concede on liberal Democratic goals
like the public health care plan favored by the Left. Called the “public option,” it would have
greatly reduced the power of health insurers by enabling governmental competition and
consequently driving down premiums.10 Many in the Republican Party believe it would signify a
complete government takeover of the health system. The decision of the President to remove the
public option from the health care bill preserves and expands the existing private health
insurance industry. The move will help the industry gain some 16 million new customers.11 In
bowing to the Republicans, the President does not want the expansion of health care to be
implicated in charges of socialism. To Democrats, this withdrawal means that Mr. Obama fails to
embody the Johnsonian or New Deal democrat they were hoping to get. In maneuvering this
defeat, Republicans emerged victorious, concluding that many Americans see the private sector
as more effective and efficient than the government.
While the Republicans believe that the American people are on their side of the argument,
President Obama believes that he has a mandate for change that supersedes their claims.
Obama’s landmark election to the presidency has been mythologized, almost in a messianic way,
as the change that would reinvigorate the country. Indeed, the historical significance of his
presidency was 400 years in the making. In overcoming the liabilities of race in a history fraught
with centuries of usurpations of minority civil rights, Obama has vindicated the Civil Rights
struggle and its promise of a multiracial democracy. He helped, therefore, to rebuild the
American conception of racial democracy by integrating the country’s principles into a more
tangible manifestation of the Jeffersonian rhetoric that, “All men are created equal.” In fact,
Obama himself argues that one goal of his presidency was to realize this idealized national belief.
In his speech “A More Perfect Union,” candidate Obama maintains that his objective is to
“narrow that gap between the promise of our ideals and the reality of their [the Founding
Fathers’] time….to continue the long march of those who came before us, a march for a more
just, more equal, more free, more caring and more prosperous America.”12 The latter part of Mr.
Obama’s rhetoric, argues the Republican Party, demonstrates his longing for an America that
corresponds to his hopes for a socialist nation. And yet, the racial phenomenon that Obama
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represents has even perforated the Republican establishment. The New York Times reports that at
least 32 African Americans are running for Congress this year as Republican candidates, a surge
not seen since Reconstruction. The candidates admit that Mr. Obama’s election empowered them
to appeal to the white electorate. The phenomenon of Obama is thus the transformability of his
presidency. He transformed how race and politics intersect in U.S. society’s imagination of itself.
Hence, Obama as President lessens the skepticism that white voters may have had about black
candidates. Through him, those candidates are granted better accessibility to the traditionally
conservative blocs of the Republican constituency. In this context, President Obama blurs the
color-line, even in a post-partisan way, as he challenges the institutional polarity of racism. In
essence, Obama’s historic accomplishment as the first black president is “The leading edge of
this change, but his success is merely the ripple in a pond that grows deeper every day.”13
Even more significant is the epiphenomenalism of Obama as a contemporary producer of
history. Simply put, the President has unleashed the deep racial hopes and antagonisms of the
country’s history. As another candidate acknowledged, Obama’s election victory can be viewed
through the lens of history and partisan politics.14 That statement has two critical perspectives:
the historical and the political representations of the President. On the one hand, the postpartisanship that his election produced is driven by the historical search in America for a leader
that would absolve the country of its embattled racial legacy. Obama offered himself as the
quintessential citizen that Americans aspire to be, a person whose “story has seared into [his]
genetic makeup the idea that this nation is more than the sum of its parts—that out of many, we
are truly one.”15 In embodying this oneness, Obama represents the hopes of America to transcend
its racial sins. Correspondent and Public Television commentator Gwen Ifill makes an insightful
observation that, “White supporters seemed to take deep satisfaction in [Obama’s usage of] the
idea—that he could be raceless, a reassuringly optimistic view of America’s deepest burden.”16
On the other hand, he fuels partisan politics because, as one of his Republican nemeses, Newt
Gingrich, remarked, “partly the level of hostility to Obama, Pelosi and Reid makes a lot of
people pragmatically more open to a coalition” to oppose him.17
These dichotomous views of Obama’s presidency—racially inspiring, but provocatively
activist—explain why even after extolling the symbolism of the President’s power, the black
Republican candidates are trying to align themselves with the Tea Partiers. This shift occurs in
spite of the fact that 25 percent of Tea Party supporters think that the Obama administration’s
policies favor blacks over whites.18 Yet, to these black candidates, the number grossly
exaggerates what they see as plain populism against Obama’s policies, not a racist narrative that
they argue is a news media fiction. The black Republican candidates point to their skin color as
evidence that the Tea Party is indeed anti-Obama, but is not motivated by race.
The Tea Party movement’s reactionary populism precipitously formed against the backdrop of
Obama’s audacious aim to correct the inefficiencies of government and markets in providing
health care. The President wants to revamp the welfare state through a social contract in which
government serves as an innovative, efficient, and accountable catalyst for service, while also
acting as a critical problem-solving partner.19 The Affordable Health Care for America Act
reflects this vision. Yet, how to persuade the public to support his vision in a social landscape as
vast and diverse as the U.S. proves difficult. In electing Barack Obama as the first African
American president, the American electorate took a big leap of faith. For some, the symbolism of
that election presented the hope and opportunity to make significant changes. Disappointingly,
the synergy of that hope did not mobilize into a public majority that could help the President
execute his agenda for health care reform.
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III.

The Limits of Class

The fact that the euphoria over a black president did not materialize into support for health care
reform harkens back to the bulk of the argument of this essay, which is that race and class
interacted in myriad ways to produce a backlash against health care reform. That backlash is
primarily evident in the Tea Party movement, composed of a subset of voters within the
Republican constituency. Though small in numbers, their dissenting voices sprung up loudly
against Obama’s health care agenda. Tea Partiers believe in a strict, economically conservative
ideology that limits governmental power, promotes fiscal responsibility, and empowers the free
market.20 The Tea Party Patriots, the main organizers of the movement, emerged preemptively in
the spring of 2009 to block Obama’s health care initiative, arguing that his economic policies are
recipes for disaster.21 To understand why this minority matters as a voice of dissent, it is helpful
to evaluate its profile in the context of its complaints against Obama’s governance. What are the
grievances toward the phenomenon of Obama and his professed ideas for an apparent social
democracy and his efforts to implement health care reform?
For the Tea Party constituency, a survey conducted by The New York Times suggests that the
Obama administration triggers “Deep pessimism about the direction of the country and the
conviction that the policies of Mr. Obama are disproportionately directed at helping the poor
rather than the middle classes or the rich.”22 In that same poll, an overwhelming majority of Tea
Partiers does not think Mr. Obama shares the values of most Americans or understands their
problems. They are exceedingly troubled about the American economy, and a majority thinks the
administration’s policies favor the poor and African Americans.23 The conundrum here is that
they are against Obama’s prioritization of class issues, but they view his handling of race as
radically similar. This suggests that Tea Partiers conflate race and class. The emphasis of their
rhetoric implies that blacks are socially and traditionally of the lower classes. In essence, any
policy that is class oriented is therefore disproportionately focused on redressing racial issues.
They also argue that concerns about the problems facing African Americans are overblown, and
hence the social politics of the President is biased.24 Generally, they are angered by the health
care overhaul and government spending, and they have the sense that they are not represented in
the concerns of the federal government. African Americans figure in that last point because their
disproportionate position in the poor and working classes makes them by default the recipients of
the government’s supposedly abundant largesse.
A New York Times profile reveals that Tea Partiers compose 18 percent of the country’s
population and tend to be Republican, white, male, married, and older than 45.25 By sheer voting
and financial power—they are wealthier and substantively more educated than the rest of the
country—the Tea Party movement is a force not to be overlooked. At its depth, the
dissatisfaction of Tea Party supporters against government is rooted in Ayn Rand’s philosophy.
They borrow from Ayn Rand’s concepts of “egoism” and “objectivism,” two principles that
stand in stark contrast to President Obama’s communitarianism and collectivism. Egoism and
objectivism conceptually promote the self-interest of the individual as the pursuit of freedom.
Only in those two principles, they would argue, can a true social system emerge in which the
welfare of the individual prospers and individual rights flourish. Thus, they would argue that
Obamacare has been or should be discredited because it is rooted in a naive altruistic motive to
render the American individual subservient to society. That explains why they describe their
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movement’s main goal as reducing the size of government. According to The New York Times,
three-quarters of those favoring small government want further cuts in spending and lower taxes.
The focus on Rand’s philosophy highlights what has historically been American individualism
rooted in a Lockean perspective. To Tea Partiers, such a culture represents the fabric of the
country’s political identity. Some Americans believe that the President’s advocacy for a change
in the distribution of services, particularly health care, is an attempt to override the Lockean
culture. Data collected from The New York Times is particularly telling of this grievance. When
asked what they are angry about, more than 90 percent of Tea Partiers point to the country
heading in the wrong direction under the Obama administration, a view that is ideologically
driven. On that note, they believe that “America’s best years are behind us,” because programs
like national health care are proof that Obama is “Doing what the Founding Fathers never
intended to be done with the federal government.”26 One respondent expressed her complaint
that, “Mr. Obama is getting away from what America is. [Therefore] he’s a socialist.”
What is America to the Tea Partiers? It is, in the simplest terms, a unique place that promotes
democracy in an individual context. It is arguable that Tea Partiers view themselves as modern
day “Jacobins” of America. Their repudiation of any notion of dependency, coupled with the
rhetoric of “taking back America,” is the conviction that the country must be liberated from
Obama’s socialism. So entrenched is this belief that the population of the United States is
reluctant, historically and contemporarily, to accept social progressivism as radically as Mr.
Obama would like. The U.S., it appears, does not produce good results through the conflation of
class, society, and politics. That is to say, the U.S. is exceptional among nations in its
relationship between politics and great social transformations. It seems to be incapable of
implementing policies with even a slight implication of socialist politics. The argument here is
that if, prima facie, Obama’s goal is to transform health care as an attempt to install some form
of socialized medicine, then it would inevitably invoke fears of socialism. Thus, the
administration is confronted with a society wherein the direct confluence between class and
politics does not hold as simply as it perhaps would in Western European societies. Americans
lack the political consciousness to think of themselves as class subjects, thereby inhibiting
Obama’s project to conduct a massive redistribution of human services.
The political structure of America is usually unreceptive to change that requires confronting or
renouncing the accumulation of capital. Whereas Obama believes in a communitarian approach
to health care goods and services, Americans in general embrace the individualism of acquiring
such capital, not as a public good, but rather as a reflection of a meritocracy. That meritocracy
stems from preconceived notions of privatism. In other words, Americans are individually
endowed with the right to private material goods. Restricting others, primarily the poor, from
receiving such benefits is just part of the equation. To generalize, individualism is synonymous
with American nationhood. This encourages a universal belief in the doctrine that individuals, if
left to their own devices, will eventually generate their own social welfare in an unregulated
marketplace.27 When that belief is confronted, as it is through Obama’s agenda, the President’s
policies are accused of being skewed towards the poor, a class often regarded as undeserving of
those goods.
Moreover, the individualism of the American worker when coupled with America’s diverse
composition including race, ethnicity, and class translates into a stratification of racial, rather
than class, interests that cannot sufficiently challenge the political system on a macro scale. The
notion that capitalism creates an antagonistic proletariat against capital does not seem to hold.
Obama cannot hope to homogenize Americans. They are too diverse in their racial and ethnic
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interests to rally singularly around a social politics promoting the general welfare. American
workers, argues J. M. Bernstein, “are presumed to be self-owning, selling their labor time and
labor power to whom they wish.”28 As many as half of the general public shares the opinion of
Tea Partiers who, by 92 percent, say Obama is moving the country closer to socialism.29 Viewed
in this regard, the Tea Partiers do not operate in a vacuum of support. They reflect a philosophy
shared by many, if not a majority, of Americans.
More succinctly, the Lockean logic of the U.S. political system renders Americans impervious
to deep transformational change. In other words, Americans lack a collective class consciousness,
which inhibits the growth of a socialist democratic majority to readily respond to the change
Obama seeks. The early achievement of political democracy following the American Revolution
gave the American polity no great incentive (or necessity) to challenge capital directly. In
Western Europe, the struggle for enfranchisement and against feudalism fostered a strong class
consciousness that led Europeans to think more in the collective sense of public good. In contrast,
the American citizen a citizenry restricted to white men with property took on the political
identity of being an equal entity unto himself, standing in opposition to the state. That truth
repressed the potential for a social democratic majority. In the aftermath of the American
Revolution, class consciousness was constrained by the instant marriage of individual to capital,
which coalesced with the emergence of a national identity.
The class relationship to capital provides a causal explanation for why Republicans and Tea
Party members admonish Obama’s health care agenda as un-American. Whereas Obama is
proposing a system that eradicates class boundaries in health services, they deride it as
communism, mainly because they view themselves as classless individuals and private entities
unto themselves. This belief removes the social necessity for a good that is perceived as already
self-provided, further reinforcing the notion that Americanism is synonymous with the private
accumulation of goods.30 This opposition, in turn, suffocated the political progress on national
health care by attempting to restrict a privileged good, health care, from those at the margins of
society, mainly the poor and the working class. Insofar as it is a good derived from meritocratic
efforts, health care, they believe, is a matter of survival of the fittest, restricted to those who can
effectively participate in the market on an individual basis. From this angle, the poor and the
working classes have neither the resources nor the capacity to succeed, automatically making
them the weakest link in the competition.
Moreover, this belief further empowers insurance companies because most Americans identify
their interests with the socioeconomic status quo. What is the status quo in this context? It is the
American Dream: social mobility and American privatism. And such dynamics tend to absorb or
thwart potential radical movements. Hence, health care reform becomes insurance reform. As
presidential historian H. W. Brands remarked, “Americans are status quo friendly; if it ain’t
broke, don’t fix it. Obama’s opportunity was to arrive when the status quo had been jolted and, in
the eyes of many, discredited.”31 While true, his observation largely fails to account for the fact
that Obama is not accepted as the ultimate fixer. This resentment has to do with the fact that
Obama, as a social democrat, is cast as unable to simultaneously be a redeemer of the market’s
social failures and a defender of American individualism.
The private ethos of American political consciousness is seen in the current health care system,
which is reluctant to accept policies redressing class inequalities. Disinclined to confront capital
more acutely, American individualism—associated with whiteness—supported a two-tiered
health care system: public, tax-supported health care for the poor (normalized as blacks and other
people of color in usual political and cultural custom) set apart from privately funded care for the
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self-supporting (whites). The former system is represented by Medicare, Medicaid, and other
government programs that already pay for almost half of American health care. Ironically,
subsidized health care is viewed by the public as outside the American norm, and thus employed
only as a mechanism to mitigate the problems caused by those incapable of navigating the
private enterprise system. Indeed, sociologist Terry Boychuk articulates this in his study, The
Making and Meaning of Hospital Policy. He argues that a bipartisan consensus in the post-war
era instituted private insurance as the vehicle for mass coverage, relegating the government to
the role of insurer of last resort.32 Unsurprisingly, this is an example of the Lockean sensibility of
the American public and the tendency to minimize the role of government as much as possible.
Surveying this virtually stagnant political class consciousness, what sabotaged Obama’s
leadership in the health care debate is not his lack of communication with the people. Instead it is
because the people’s historical consciousness is driven by Lockean, not Marxian, ideology. At
issue is whether collectivizing the financial burden of medical care is ideologically in line with
the Lockean social order and, under that framework, whether it is appropriate to substitute a
socialized initiative for a capitalistic one. On that question, the success of the Tea Party
movement rests on its ability to convince Americans that adopting a national health care system
would part ways with their traditional understanding of the relationship between government and
the private sphere. If instituted, the Republicans argue, health care reform would destabilize
individual freedoms by allowing the federal government to command state governments to
administer a socialist program.33 This argument is directly taken from Locke’s emphasis on
individual consent as the mechanism by which the political and social can merge. In the case of
Obama’s proposed national health care, dissenters argue, the public interest would submerge the
sovereignty of the people, thus leaving Obama as the prime health care distributor (hence derives
the term Obamacare). This idea of the sovereign individual as the ultimate source of authority
suppresses what Bernstein argues is “the manifold ways that individuality is beholden to a
complex and uniquely modern form of life.”34 In essence, the individual transcends institutional
and communal dependency and exists, albeit within society, as a complete self-governing entity.
For many Americans, socialism is associated with big government, and big government is a
social problem that burdens their individuality as well as encroaches on the private sphere. Tea
Partiers are perhaps the most unapologetic adherents of this ideology, forming a political
apparatus that labors to derail health care reform. The unregulated private sphere benefits the
resiliency of American individualism. Individuality in this context is associated with a common
historical consciousness that prides John Locke’s logic of privatism over Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s concept of a general will that infallibly benefits the people. It points to why the
public has been more accepting of a moderate health program that incorporates health insurance
companies, as Obama’s initiative has attempted to do.
Lastly, the political division of the socioeconomic classes is such that it has stymied health care
legislation. While class-based politics influenced the government response to labor demands
during the New Deal, it failed to supplant ethnic, racial, and regional identities already woven
into the fabric of American life. The diverse backgrounds of Americans restrict solidarity on an
inter-group basis and thus suffocate the potential for networking across lines of difference. This
embedded culture of segmented loyalties has meant that energy that could have challenged
health insurance companies through unions is diverted instead to sustaining local, ethnic,
religious, and political institutions. This has inevitably slowed far-reaching change (like the
health care reform Obama wants) and constrained any direct challenge to capital. The Great
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Depression did not produce a socialist movement. It also did not radicalize the working class.
Boychuk’s historical analysis explains the dynamics of that division:
The granting of the vote to the laboring classes in early stages of industrialization
dampened working-class radicalism. Labor movements could not appeal to the
solidarities implied in the shared experience of political disenfranchisement.
Pronounced barriers to working-class political mobilization stemming from
crosscutting social cleavages contributed to the hegemony of loosely articulated
bourgeois parties over national policy making. Class-specific appeals did not
become the central organizing theme of national campaigns in the postwar era.35
If there is an American proletariat, it is not culturally, racially, or ethnically homogeneous. Nor
was it formed in direct conflict to capitalism. This segmentation not only inhibited class
consciousness, but subsequently created a political culture of sectional interests. In their ideal
path to social mobility, Americans generally do not possess a significant awareness of class
distinctions and instead lean in favor of retaining the status quo. Obama’s message, then, of
collectivized health care stands in opposition to the broader American consensus on individual
fulfillment.
In sum, the Tea Party perceives government power as limitless and the evils of the welfare state
necessitate the broad expansion of individual responsibility. Equally evident within this agenda is the
de-politicization of the public sphere through the increased politicization of the individual. Hence,
national health care as a public good is largely scorned because the individual should not be
subordinated to the common good. Deregulation and privatization thus become rampant and strip the
citizen of any obligation to others. The public good, viewed as a pathological drain on the market, is
individualized to accommodate personal responsibility. This free-market fundamentalism undermines
public solidarity through an unchecked ideology of privatization. Furthermore, it derides government
support for the unemployed, poor, and economically under-resourced as socialism—a constraint on
the market-driven logic of unrestricted individual responsibility.36
IV. Leadership Failures
The country is currently in a deep economic crisis, one that provokes fear, disrupts national unity,
and diminishes public confidence in institutions. The Tea Party movement not only reflects this
anxiety, but heightens national divisions as the Tea Partiers and President Obama polarize the
political scene through their ideological confrontations. The President’s credibility has partially
been fractured by the label of socialism. The American polity is therefore divided at a time that
demands unity. This division inevitably creates a vacuum of power in the public discourse on
how to move the country forward. Given the catastrophic conditions in which he is leading, and
the fragile political climate in which he must maneuver, the President must prevent the further
fragmentation of the polity and keep the entire system from becoming politically moribund. The
American public is often averse to politics that hint at socialistic transformations. This confronts
Obama with an ideological block. Although he succeeded in enacting his version of health care
reform, he will need to be just as tenacious to prevent the opposition from diluting his other
major legislative agendas, particularly comprehensive immigration reform and environmental
policies. To do so, President Obama must (1) reassert civic leadership by introducing bold ideas
that unite and reform, (2) re-energize the confidence of the populace in government, and (3)
assert the primacy of his leadership.
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First, to counteract the current political culture, Obama must provide legislation that
restructures people’s economic relationships with institutions and, subsequently, redefines the
economy. The President did not properly utilize innovative ideas in combating conventional
norms. Although he prevented a Great Depression on Wall Street, the country witnesses the
continued decline of economic livelihoods. Although he argued for a safety net for the too-bigto-fail corporate entities, small businesses are experiencing budget cuts. Although he subsidized
the largest financial institutions, the consumers and taxpayers resent these institutions for their
lack of reciprocity, viewing them as free riders. It is appropriate here to point out that the Tea
Party’s concerns are not entirely without merit. Their policy logic, albeit a paradoxical demand,
is that the President must perform a balancing act: pursue health care reform without
cumulatively expanding government, and retain services like Medicare and Social Security but
not at the expense of individual choices by the hard-working producers of wealth.
In short, Obama prevented a Great Depression, but did not avert a moral crisis or the
continuing decadence of the financial culture. While he excels at pragmatism, he failed at
instituting broad social transformations that could have exploited the political opportunities
generated by the crisis. His policies skewed more toward rebuilding institutions rather than
reforming them. This is a failure of leadership insofar as he wasted the chance to delegitimize
old economic ideas and reshuffle resources in a fashion that did not pit Wall Street against Main
Street. Precisely because existing economic institutions are products of old economic ideas,
fundamentally reforming them would have given the president the political capital to convince
the nation that the current economic crisis is a function of a particular set of institutional failures.
In not contesting this underlying factor, Obama legitimized the existing corporate culture,
encouraged the burgeoning of right-wing populism, and ultimately reduced his chances to build
coalitions to restructure the relationship of the polity to the welfare state.
Second, historically, when the nation falls on hard times, the people have looked to
government for a solution. The contemporary climate instead has produced a different result: a
greater reduction in the size of government and its services. This paradox, as explained
throughout the essay, facilitated a populism grounded in American individualism and an
ideological roadblock to significant social change. The current economic distress not only fueled
right-wing populist sentiments against health care reform, but also weakened the President from
asserting the need for government in resolving problems. This resulted in minimal civic
participation in the shaping of a transformative legislation. Coalition building ensures stability by
reconstituting collective interests in addressing the major dysfunctions of the economy (the
health care industry being a primary example). So far, however, Obama has failed to harness
such civic participation.
Third, President Obama’s political leadership can be typified as one built on idealism and
pragmatism. Obama is an idealist driven by the ambition to not just tinker with social problems,
but to fundamentally transform the systemic failures of the American economic and political
model. Although first an idealist, Obama must shape his ideas through pragmatism, a level of
leadership requiring that his vision is molded by the possibilities provided by real circumstances.
Obama’s pragmatism and subsequent bipartisanism, although commendable, can result in defeat
and the compromising of deep ideological beliefs. Bipartisanship of that nature reduces
confidence in the leader and looks to the opposition for specters of renewed leadership. Obama’s
bipartisan strategy on the surface appears to have conformed to the belief that consensus is best
in producing good governance. This “unity at all costs” posture, however, does not fit the nature
of today’s historic crises. As noted by historian Sam Haselby, bipartisanship obscures real
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accomplishments and is more of an invented concept rather than reflective of realpolitik.37 In
times of crisis like the one plaguing the U.S., partisanship has had more success. Through the
trauma of tough and divisive debate, partisanship helps to legitimize and delegitimize ideas,
clarifies new ways of thinking about policy, and provides a new path forward. Such battles of
ideas propel the country forward by sustaining democratic conversations, allowing for debates in
which the public can discern bad suggestions from good. In contrast, bipartisan ideals promote
unity with moderate agreements. Rather than agreeing to disagree, issues are compartmentalized
at the expense of a more holistic approach. Obama’s idealism has not come to fruition because it
is being shaped by the confusion of trading pragmatism for bipartisanship. The two are not
synonymous. Bipartisanship seeks to establish universality, whereas pragmatism looks for
reasoned, practical consequences. Bipartisanship diffuses attention away from practical debate
and strong advocacy for new ideas.
Moreover, when fresh ideas are marginalized through a strategy of too much give-and-take,
policy becomes less concrete. The President’s oblivious bipartisanism represses hope and faith in
what could be achieved on a grand scale and diverts attention to what is easier to attain now. In
essence, bipartisanism strips pragmatism of the need for strong propositions. Such cooptation
dilutes the hope for bigger and longer-term results in favor of quick fixes, reducing the agenda of
“change” to quid-pro-quo politicking. Furthermore, bipartisanism has no first principle, thus
lacking a constructive repertoire from which to find guidance and justification. Stanley Fish, a
humanist columnist for The New York Times, argues that Obama’s ideal bipartisanship
diminishes, if not “disqualifies [his] whole enterprise [of revamping the welfare state], at least in
its more ambitious forms. What it leaves are the pleasures of thinking about thinking, freed from
the burdensome expectation that we will finally get somewhere.”38 The President’s cautious and
sometimes overly methodical decision making often requires scaling down his own agenda to
incorporate others at the cost of little or no results. When that power is submerged by a notion of
bipartisanship, the public tends to retreat to the perception that all that can be done is to muddle
through. When Obama is overly cautious, then Tea Partiers can easily convince the population to
look for a source of leadership that is antithetical to his style and agenda.
V. The Potential of Leadership
The circumstances that swept Mr. Obama into office were of a historic nature that cannot be
overemphasized. He is the product of a crisis but will have to shape that crisis to yield great
results. The conventional belief that crises produce singular individuals is credible in this
instance. Judging by the magnitude of the problems the country faces, Obama’s leadership will
inevitably be seen in light of Thomas Carlyle’s “Great Man Theory.” The exercise of
Machiavellian wisdom coupled with charisma and intelligence allow men of Obama’s caliber to
use power decisively in impacting history. His election was historically significant, but the
euphoric hopes that it instigated—national unity, transformative change, the dawn of a new
political consensus—seem to be waning. As argued in Judith Butler’s “Uncritical Exuberance?,”
many on the Left risked believing that Obama’s election was the political moment at which
national unity would be embraced to overcome the antagonisms of today’s political life. 39 Indeed,
Obama did fulfill the aspirations for racial representation in the nation.
President Obama also seemed to reconfigure a consensus on political goals. It was a “unity” in
which one could apparently hold very discrepant views that disagreed with Obama’s perspectives,
but at the same time support him.40 As argued here, that same civic optimism has not transferred
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from campaigning to leading the country. The representative function of the presidency as a
mixed marriage of racial unity has not lasted in the face of the Tea Party movement and
widespread opposition to Obama’s social democratic agenda. The opposition is rooted in the fact
that Obama’s health care reform seeks to broaden services that were once restricted by the
private sphere. Endogenous to the Tea Partiers racialism is the lack of class consciousness of
most Americans. Hence, Obama, for the most part, won the health care battle but bled enough
political capital that he will ceaselessly have to fight the opposition in promoting his other
domestic reforms.
The President’s racial identity does present an interesting political opportunity that must not be
understated. He has the rare ability to govern as a black president, whose historic presence is
mistaken by Tea Partiers to be a statement of his policy priorities. Whereas Roosevelt’s New
Deal was largely seen to have benefited working-class whites, and Johnson’s Great Society to
assist African Americans, Obama’s social policies, and more specifically health care reform,
may be the first to merge the two constituencies beyond the racial perceptions of policy. He
understands the plight of nonwhites because of his African American heritage. His leadership is
also positioned in a time of urgency, one in which his social policies may have broad
consequences in transforming and transcending class divisions. This uncanny potential can help
President Obama succeed where his predecessors could not.
Moving forward, President Obama should try to model the Great Man paradigm. His
leadership will have to utilize its quality of nobility to attain the greater good for everyone
through a pragmatism that is even more audacious than what Obama is currently offering or
imagined. He must also exude the courage to materialize the hope he promised through a civil
Machiavellian control of power that neither corrupts nor compromises his principles and beliefs.
(Machiavellian here refers specifically to the need to make others do as he wants, in addition to
taking advantage of opportunities as they arise, averting challenges before they limit change, and
confronting opponents impartially.) The political life of the times demands no greater leadership
than that. However, Mr. Obama must still maintain caution so as not to disrespect opponents.
Respect necessitates the cultivation of understanding his opponents’ arguments. After all, the
purpose is not power for power’s sake, but the need to establish a stable political order that
facilitates the achievement of a just society for everyone.
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